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This paper presents two empirical evaluations of Asynchronous CMC Deception Detection Theory 
(ACDDT) in the CMC genres of legitimate and spam e-mail. The ACDDT theorizes that deception 
detection in asynchronous text is indicated by the presence of the constructs of concealment, 
normality, and isolation. The ACDDT was tested on two common types of e-mail that attempt to 
deceive the reader/recipient, e-mail that attempted to steal the recipient’s personal identification 
information and e-mail that attempted to steal the recipient’s money. The e-mail was clustered 
using the text mining. The terms representing the clusters were analyzed using text analysis. The 
constructs developed from the text analysis provided measures of the hypotheses. Both tests 
confirmed that ACDDT provides a theoretical base for detection of deception in e-mail. The 
contributions of this work are support for the ACDDT and a development of a new and unique 
method of detecting fraudulent e-mail. 
 . 
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Introduction 
The paper reports an ongoing work that empirically tests a new theory to detect deception in asynchronous 
Computer-Mediated Communication (CMC). The Asynchronous CMC Deception Detection Theory (ACDDT) 
(Glancy, 2010) proposes that concealment, normality, and isolation play a direct role in detecting deception in text 
documents. The ACDDT is unique because it was developed specifically for asynchronous text. This paper presents 
the empirical testing of ACDDT in the area of spam. Spam is unsolicited email (Androutsopoulos et al., 2000; Clark 
et al., 2003; Cormack & Kotcz, 2009). MessageLabs (2010) estimated that spam in January 2010 comprised 83.9% 
of all e-mail. Spam is estimated to cost e-mail users $130 billion annually (Jennings, 2009). This cost continues to 
rise (Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2009). The cost of spam is from the detection and maintenance of detection 
filters, the clogging of email storage, time users spend reading spam, and the direct cost to users that fall victim of 
the spam. This research addresses fraudulent e-mail, specifically identity theft and money theft. It has been 
estimated that these types of fraud cost users $2.6 billion in 2008 (Jennings, 2009; Synovate, 2007).  
There is a large segment of research that concentrates on methods to distinguish spam from not spam, which is also 
called ham. Spam is often sent from programs that send out the emails to large lists of email addresses (Rigoutsos & 
Huynh, 2004). Our survey of existing spam filtering research indicated that spam-filtering methods are mechanical; 
the filters are constructed from existing and identified spam. New e-mail is categorized as legitimate or spam by 
comparison to the filter. Spam filters are not stable and require frequent rebuilding. An example (Rios & Zha, 2004) 
is that a filter may recognize the word Viagra, but not vi*gra or v!agra or <Viagr*. When the filter depends on a 
database for comparison or grading, the filter is always chasing the spammer.   
In this work we empirically evaluated the Asynchronous CMC Deception Detection Theory (ACDDT) in two tests 
on spam. The research question for this work was: Does the ACDDT provide a theoretical base for detection of 
deception in e-mail? A method of filtering spam with a theoretical base for spam detection could potentially lead to 
the development of a unique method of spam detection. This work is organized as follows: Section 2 gives 
background on spam, spam detection, and the ACDDT; Section 3 discusses operationalization of the ACDDT on 
email; Section 4 discusses the testing and results; Section 5 discusses the research contribution; and Section 6 
presents conclusions and future work. 
Section 2 - Background 
In this section, we briefly review spam, spam detection methods, and the ACDDT. 
Spam 
Spam is most general defined as unsolicited email (Clark, et al., 2003; Cormack & Kotcz, 2009; Cormack & Lynam, 
2007). The purpose of most spam is to commit deception (MessageLabs, 2010); deception is defined as the 
intentional misleading of another such that they draw an inaccurate conclusion (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; DePaulo, 
et al., 2003). When the deception violates the law, it becomes fraud. The top ten types of Internet fraud reported by 
the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) (Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2009) are: non-delivery, auction 
fraud, credit fraud, confidence fraud, computer fraud, check fraud, Nigerian letter fraud, identity theft, financial 
institution fraud, and threats/cyber stalking. E-mail was identified as the source of 74% of the Internet fraud in 2008. 
The direct loss by the individual from Internet fraud reported to the IC3 in 2008 was $264.6 million. The estimated 
cost of spam in 2009 was $130 billion worldwide and $42 billion in the United States (Jennings, 2009). The loss of 
productivity is estimated to be 85% of the total cost of spam. This includes the time spent deleting spam, looking for 
e-mail that has been mistakenly identified as spam, and reading spam. An estimated 62 trillion spam e-mails were 
sent in 2008 (ICF International, 2009). From this, we conclude that spam is a major problem for the Internet and 
users, and spam is a global problem.  
Spam Detection  
A spam filter is a program that attempts to identify and segregate spam from legitimate email. These programs can 
either stand-alone such as the open source SpamAssassin (Apache Software Foundation, 2010) or be incorporated as 
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part of an e-mail program as with Google’s Gmail. Spam filters use a variety of classification methods. The earliest 
filters used heuristics and keywords (Hidalgo et al., 2000). Later classification methods used statistical methods to 
extract a set of features that are compared to a new email and used to decide if the email is spam or not (Hershkop & 
Stolfo, 2005; Zhang et al., 2004). These methods include naive Bayesian (Androutsopoulos, et al., 2000; Schneider, 
2003), N-gram (Zhang, et al., 2004), support vector machines and random forests (Rios & Zha, 2004), and neural 
network (Clark, et al., 2003). The filter is created from a database of spam and legitimate e-mail. The filter may look 
at some or all of the features of the e-mail; these features include the sender’s name, IP address, subject, e-mail body 
text (with or without punctuation and special characters), and images (Aradhye, Myers, & Herson, 2005). The 
design of the filter may rely on one method (Goodman & Yih, 2006) or combine methods into a single filter 
(Hershkop & Stolfo, 2005; Lynam & Cormack, 2006). Because these methods create a filter from a set of spam e-
mails, as the spammers change methods the filter needs updating (Delany et al., 2005). Most of the filters are 
binomial. When the new email is compared to the filter, the answer is either spam or legitimate. The spam is either 
rejected or sent to the recipient’s spam folder and the legitimate e-mail to their inbox. 
It is generally believed that the cost of spam is low compared to the value of legitimate e-mail (Androutsopoulos, et 
al., 2000). A common measure of the utility of a spam filter is percentage of false positives; a false positive is an e-
mail that is legitimate and has been mistakenly identified as spam (Yih, et al., 2006). Spam filters have false positive 
rates less than 0.1 percent. Maintaining low false positive rates allows spam to reach the user at rates as high as five 
percent. This means that of the 62 trillion spam e-mails, 3.1 trillion spam e-mails get past the filter. We tested the 
Asynchronous CMC Deception Detection Theory on this 5% of spam that got past a spam filter and were sent to the 
user as legitimate e-mail.  
Asynchronous CMC Deception Detection Theory 
The ACDDT has been developed as part of the coauthor’s dissertation research (Glancy, 2010). The ACDDT asserts 
that deception can be detected in asynchronous text. Most extant research on deception has been in face-to-face 
communication with a concentration on the cues a deceiver gives that reveal the deception (DePaulo et al., 2003). 
The cues that were identified were verbal (both textual and oral), behavioral, and physical. The ACDDT (Glancy, 
2010) is a theory of deception detection in asynchronous textual communication, which has limited types of 
deceptive cues (Lee et al., 2009). The first ACDDT concept is Deception Detection. Deception is the deliberate 
misleading of another so that they draw an incorrect conclusion (Buller and Burgoon, 1996, Carlson et al., 2004, 
DePaulo et al., 1996, DePaulo et al., 2003). Because deception is deliberate, the deceiver knows what s/he is doing, 
and does it with the intent to mislead. A deception can be through concealing facts, obfuscation of facts, creating 
false information, and through combinations of these (DePaulo et al., 2003). Detection is the identification of that 
what is not clearly seen. Deception detection occurs when a receiver of the deceptive message realizes that the 
message is deliberately misleading. The ACDDT is based on the assumption that deception in asynchronous 
communication is detectable because the writer knows or suspects that the communication he/she is writing is false, 
and it is written to deceive the reader. This knowledge causes both conscious and subconscious cognitive, affective 
and conative reactions in the writer (Bagozzi, 1992). The writer reveals these reactions in the text of the 
communication. The detectable concepts in the text of deceptive writing are concealment, normality and isolation. 
Concealment is the manifestation of the action oriented or conative concept. Normality is the manifestation of 
cognitive concept, and the Isolation concept is the affective reaction to the deception. Because the deceptive writing 
has these concepts present in the text, the deception can be detected. The first overall ACDDT proposition is that 
concealment, normality, and isolation are positively related to the detection of deception (Glancy, 2010). Table 1 
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Table 1.  ACDDT Concepts, Constructs, and Hypotheses 
Concepts Propositions Constructs (a + means the construct-
presence increases with deception and a - 
means the construct-presence decreases 






Collectives +; Ambivalence -; Denial - H1. The presence of Collectives, 
Ambivalence, and Denial is 
positively related to deception 
detection. 




Leveling +; Diversity -; Centrality - H2. The presence of Leveling, 
Diversity, and Centrality is 
positively related to deception 
detection. 




Aggression +; Exclusion +; Liberation +; 
Rapport -; Cooperation -; Motion - 
H3. The presence of Aggression, 
Exclusion, Liberation, Rapport, 
Cooperation, and Motion is 
positively related to deception 
detection. 
 
The second ACDDT proposition is that concealment is positively related to deception. The concealment could be 
from misstatement of facts or from omission of information. The constructs of increased Collectives, less 
Ambivalence, and less Denial contribute to the concept of concealment. Collectives are singular nouns that connote 
plurality and function to decrease specificity. These words include social groupings such as crowd and team, task 
groups such as congress and staff, and geographical entities such county and world. Ambivalence is indicated by 
words expressing hesitation or uncertainty; included in this group are words such as perhaps, might, allegedly, 
approximate, would, and almost. They imply the writer’s reluctance to commit to what is being written. Denial is the 
use of terms that express negativity such as nor, not, nothing, none, and nobody. We hypothesize that the presence 
of collectives, ambivalence, and denial in a text document is positively related to the detection of deception.  
The third ACDDT proposition is that normality is positively related to deception. The concept of normality is related 
to the writer’s desire to give an impression that there is no deception occurring. This attempt whether conscious or 
unconscious causes the writer to use terms that express normality differently than would occur in non-deceptive 
writing. The constructs of increased Leveling, less Diversity, and less Centrality contribute to the expression of 
normality in asynchronous text. Leveling terms are words used to ignore differences and create a sense of 
completeness. These terms include words such as always, completely, everyone, each, unconditional, and absolute. 
Diversity is expressed through the use of words that identify individuals or groups that differ from the norm. 
Examples of these words include inconsistent, exceptional, illegitimate, dispersed, diffuse, deviant, and rare. 
Centrality refers to terms that denote regularities and/or agreement on core values. This includes terms such as 
native, basic, orthodox, ritualistic, standardized, conformity, unanimous, and reliable. We hypothesize that the 
presence of leveling, diversity, and centrality in a text document is positively related to deception detection. 
The fourth ACDDT proposition is that isolation is positively related to deception. The concept of isolation is related 
to the writer’s affective isolation from the norms of society by committing deception. Because the writer of 
deceptive text had some level of awareness of the deception, the writer felt that he was socially isolated. This 
isolation is expressed in the constructs of increased Aggression, increased Exclusion, increased Liberation, less 
Cooperation, less Rapport, and less Motion. Aggression is expressed in words that indicate competition and forceful 
action. Examples of these terms include crash, collide, conquest, violation, command, challenge, mastered, pushy, 
poke, shove, demolish, prevent, reduce, and defend. Exclusion terms express the sources and effects of social 
isolation and include words such as displaced, repudiated, secede, privacy, forsakes, loneliness, nihilism, and spurn. 
Liberation is expressed in words that maximize individual choice and reject social conventions. Examples of these 
terms include autonomous, options, radical, eccentric, liberty, freedom, disentangle, and loosen. Cooperation is 
expressed in terms that refer to group behavioral interactions. Examples of these words include unions, caucus, 
partner, comrade, friendship, teamwork, contribute, and network. Rapport is expressed in words that indicate 
 Glancy & Yadav / Is It Spam or Ham? 
  
 Thirty First International Conference on Information Systems, St. Louis 2010 5 
attitudinal similarities among groups of people. These terms include congenial, companion, approve, tolerant, 
permission, and consensus. Motion is expressed by words that connote human movement such as job, leap, circulate, 
revolve, travel, ride, fly, zip, and lurch. We hypothesize that the presence of aggression, exclusion, liberation, 
cooperation, rapport, and motion in a text document is positively related to deception detection. 
Section 3 - ACDDT Evaluation Process 
A systematic process to evaluate ACDDT is shown in Figure 1. The ACDDT propositions are operationalized by 
formulation of specific and testable hypotheses for each test. A set of measures is developed. Domain specific text 
documents are collected, matched one-to-one, and a data set is created. The text documents are appropriately 
formatted before they are imported into the SAS Enterprise Miner software. The data sets are prepared for text 
mining. The text mining is performed, single value decomposition (SVD) (Albright, 2004) of the term-document 
matrix is generated, and the SVDs are clustered(Roiger and Geatz, 2003; de Ville, 2006). Terms representing the 
clusters are determined by binomial probability. The text documents were analyzed using a computational model for 
fraud detection (CFDM) (Glancy and Yadav, 2010). The CFDM supports the text mining steps of ACDDT 
evaluation process shown in figure 1. The top100 terms representing a cluster are analyzed using Diction 5.0 text 
analysis program. The text analysis step associates terms with constructs. Construct scores are computed and data 
analysis is performed to compute various statistics. The test results are compared to the hypothesis. 
 
 
Figure 1. Theory Evaluation Process 
 
Two separate and independent tests of the ACDDT were conducted on spam e-mail. Testing in these genres requires 
operationalization of the ACDDT’s propositions and general hypotheses stated in table 1 and the development of 
measures. 
Construct Measures 
The ACDDT propositions relate the independent concepts of concealment, normality, and isolation to the concept of 
deception. These propositions must be operationalized so that they can be measured; they are indicated by the 
twelve constructs described above. The constructs are measurable in text through text analysis. While this can be 
achieved through coding of the texts, it is faster and more consistent to use a text analysis software program to code 
and relate the text to constructs. Diction 5.0 does this using a database that relates a word or term to a construct 
(Hart & Carroll, 2010). The database was created and validated on over 20,000 documents. The scores reported for 
each construct are standardized to allow comparison. 
Breakthrough Ideas 
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Of the twelve constructs described previously, five increase with deception and seven decrease with deception. The 
change is measured for the spam e-mail relative to legitimate e-mail. Constructs whose score increases with 
deception are represented as construct A. The score for construct A is a function (ƒ) of the difference between the 
scores for the two clusters expressed as: 
S(A) = ƒ(SAD - SAL) (1) 
Where: S(A) is the measure of construct A, which increases with deception 
 SAD is the score of construct A for the deceptive spam  
 SAL is the score of construct A for the legitimate e-mail 
The constructs whose score decrease with deception are represented as construct B. The score for construct B is a 
function (ƒ) of the difference between the scores for the two clusters expressed as: 
S(B) = ƒ(SBL - SBD) (2) 
Where: S(B) is the measure of construct B, which decreases with deception 
 SBD is the score of construct B for the deceptive spam 
 SBL is the score of construct B for the legitimate e-mail 
Section 4 - ACDDT Testing 
Two types of spam were collected for the test. They were spam that attempts to steal the recipient’s identity and 
spam that attempts to get the recipient to send them money fraudulently. These two types were selected because they 
are fraudulent and common (Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2009). The typical identity theft will spoof a 
financial institution and request the recipient to follow a link and put in his identity data to reactivate his account. 
The Nigerian letter is a typical example of a money theft spam. The recipient’s assistance is requested to help the 
sender get money out of some country and is offered a percentage of the money. If the recipient responds, a request 
for money will be made in a subsequent e-mail. A newer spam of this type is sent to a recipient from someone he 
knows by a spammer who has gained access to that person’s e-mail account. The request is for money to be wired to 
the spammer because of an emergency. If the recipient responds and sends money, there are often additional 
requests.  
Data Collection 
E-mail users determined the Deception Detection construct by selecting the two types of spam e-mails. The authors 
sent a request via Facebook for identity theft and money theft spam that had been sent to the recipient’s inbox. Forty 
individuals responded and sent the authors over three thousand spam e-mails of each type. The authors obtained 
legitimate fund raising e-mails (money requests) from the Susan G. Komen Foundation, the March of Dimes, and 
the American Cancer Society for comparison with the money theft spam. Legitimate e-mail sent by financial and 
investment organizations was collected for comparison with identity theft e-mail. All e-mails were collected in 
November 2009. 
Testing Method 
The computational fraud detection model (CFDM) (Glancy and Yadav, 2010) was used for classification of the e-
mails in each test. Previous work (Glancy, 2010, Glancy and Yadav, 2010) indicated that the CFDM effect size 
would be large. With a 0.20 effect size, and a two-tailed alpha of 0.01, the statistical power is 96% for a sample size 
of 110 if 69 of the 110 samples are correctly classified (Cohen, 1988) A sample size of 110 was selected for both 
tests. The e-mail included in the test was randomly selected from the each database of e-mail collected by using the 
random number generator in MS Excel. Fifty-five money theft e-mails were randomly selected and combined with 
fifty-five randomly selected legitimate money request emails to form a data set of 110 e-mails. This was repeated for 
the identity theft e-mail and matching legitimate e-mail. The document sets were text mined and each was 
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hierarchically clustered. The highest weighted one hundred terms representing each cluster were extracted. The 
terms were selected using binomial probability. These terms were analyzed with Diction 5.0 text analysis software. 
Diction 5.0 does this using a database that relates a word or term to a construct (Hart and Carroll, 2010). The score 
of each cluster construct was the standardized score reported by Diction 5.0. The construct measures were calculated 
using equations 1 and 2.  
Findings 
The e-mails clustered very well in both tests. The clustering correctly identified 107 out of 110 e-mails for the 
Identity theft test and 104 out of 110 for the Money theft test. The binomial p-values (Conover, 1999) in table 1 
show that the results are quite significant. The statistical power is greater than 96% (Cohen, 1988). 










Money Theft Test 
Hypothesis Score 
Concealment  – H1                                             2.08                       2.62 
 Collectives 1.35  2.18  
 Ambivalence 0.52  2.94  
 Denial 0.21  -2.50  
Normality – H2                             6.39                        2.65 
 Leveling 5.12  -2.35  
 Diversity 0.00  5.00  
 Centrality 1.27  0.00  
















-1.17  -3.65  
 Less Rapport 0.00  4.87  




False Positive 1 2 
False Negative 2 4 
Clustering 
Results 
p-value 3.325 x 10-28 3.300 x 10-24 
 
The first test was on identity theft spam. The results confirmed H1. The sum of measures of collectives, 
ambivalence, and denial in the test e-mail clusters is positively related to detection of identity theft spam e-mail. The 
scores for the three individual constructs were positive. The results confirmed H2. The sum of the measures of 
Breakthrough Ideas 
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leveling, diversity, and centrality is positively related to detection of identity theft spam e-mail. The diversity score 
was zero, and both leveling and centrality were positive. The leveling score was very positive. This indicates that the 
spammers made a strong effort to impress the recipient that the message was legitimate by using words that indicate 
assurance. This was not necessary for the legitimate e-mail because it was from a legitimate source. The results 
confirmed H3. The sum of the measures of exclusion, liberation, aggression, cooperation, rapport, and motion is 
positively related to detection of identity theft spam e-mail. The rapport and motion scores were zero indicating 
there was no difference between spam and legitimate e-mails for these constructs. The cooperation score was 
negative. The aggression score was very high. This can be explained by the spammer’s trying to get the recipient to 
click on a link and input identity information. The spammer uses aggressive words to convince the recipient of the 
danger of not following the spam instructions. 
The second test was on money theft spam. The results confirmed H1. The sum of measures of collectives, 
ambivalence, and denial is positively related to detection of money theft spam e-mail. The score for denial was 
negative. This can be interpreted that for spam e-mails that try to get the recipient to send money, the sender used 
more negative words. One explanation may be that most of this type of e-mail contained a strongly worded 
disclaimer as an attempt to convince the recipient of the legitimacy of the request. The results confirmed H2.  The 
sum of the measures of leveling, diversity, and centrality is positively related to detection of money theft spam e-
mail. The leveling score was negative and centrality was zero; the score for diversity was very high. The diversity 
score indicates that very few words that would indicate differences between individuals or groups were used in the 
spam compared to the legitimate e-mail. The results confirmed H3. The sum of the measures of exclusion, 
liberation, aggression, cooperation, rapport, and motion is positively related to detection of money theft spam e-
mail. The aggression, rapport, and exclusion scores were positive. The rapport score was surprisingly high indicating 
a lack words that would build rapport. Because the spammer is trying to get the recipient to send money, we had 
expectations that the spammer would try to build a rapport with the recipient. The cooperation score was negative 
indicating the spammer did try eliciting the recipient’s cooperation.  
All of the hypotheses in both tests were confirmed. Both tests empirically support the ACDDT.  
Section 5 - Research Contribution 
The contribution of this research work is two empirical tests of a new and unique theory that presents an explanation 
of why deception is detectable in asynchronous CMC. The ACDDT proposes the concepts of Concealment, 
Normality, Isolation, and Deception Detection. The concepts relate to the individual’s conative, cognitive, and 
affective functions; and deception is detected, because the individual unconsciously reveals the deception in the 
attempt to prevent detection by the receiver. The ACDDT propositions explain the relationships between the four 
concepts. The ACDDT is the first theory that goes beyond how deception is achieved and attempts to explain why 
the deception is detectable.  
The support provided by these tests is a major demonstration for a deception detection theory in asynchronous 
CMC. The e-mail that was used in the test had already been identified as legitimate by conventional spam filters, 
which increases the confidence in the support for the ACDDT. Finding support for the ACDDT in two types of 
spam e-mail provides an indication that the ACDDT may be generalizable to other types of e-mail and possibly 
other genres.  
The ACDDT provides a theoretical base for developing advanced deception detection tools. The CFDM (Glancy & 
Yadav, 2010) is an example of one possible deception detection tool. These tools may allow early detection of 
financial reporting fraud. Early detection can limit financial loss from fraud, and it may in the future provide a 
deterrent to financial fraud. 
Section 6 - Conclusions and Future Work 
A systematic evaluation process was followed to test the ACDDT in two genres—identity theft and spam. Both tests 
supported the hypotheses and provided empirical evidence for the ACDDT validity. In addition, the coauthor’s 
dissertation (Glancy, 2010) has also tested the ACDDT on the Notes to the annual financial statements of companies 
using the evaluation process supported by CFDM and text analysis software Diction 5.0. The Notes contain the 
accountant’s explanations of the financial statements. The Security Exchange Commission (SEC) requires disclosure 
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of anything that has the potential to significantly impact the future results of a business. The notes are prepared by 
and/or reviewed by auditing accountants. The test results on Notes also provided a strong support for the ACDDT.  
The testing could be criticized for using a small sample and selecting e-mails in two categories that are recognized 
as fraudulent. The successful categorization of spam and legitimate e-mail does indicate that the effect size is large 
for the ACDDT and that the sample size was appropriate. There is no claim made at this juncture that all spam is 
deceptive. Further and extensive work would be needed to verify that deception is prevalent in most spam. 
The CFDM tool, based upon ACDDT, has the potential to be the basis of a predictive model for fraud detection in 
financial reporting. The ACDDT and CFDM open additional research areas: deception in business-to-consumer 
websites, deception in consumer-to-consumer websites, and increasing the understanding of the mechanisms present 
in asynchronous text deception. Further work analyzing the singular value decomposition and the respective 
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